The current Global Security Architecture is ill-equipped to deal with the problems that beset Afghanistan. Creating the stability and prosperity necessary to establish a politically and economically friendly member of the international community are core elements of making a success of Afghanistan.
There is manifestly a requirement for a new global security architecture to deal with conflicts and in particular ‘War on Terror’ conflicts. The current rulebook on how the International Community approaches conflict needs to be rewritten.
A new system of conflict management is needed to both plan for the worst situation while hoping for the best. There must be sufficient contingency planning to handle the most complex of security challenges. Unfortunately, the present infrastructure cannot respond effectively to what we have now, let alone future worst case scenarios.
This New Architecture must provide a structure for intervention as a threat containment tool - a way to ensure security by minimising current threats or preventing them from escalating into full-blown insurgencies with linkages to militant Islamist groups.
The neat organisational charts of the current global security architecture no longer fit contemporary crises such as those of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the resulting policy incoherence means the bigger picture is being lost in the maelstrom of individual countries’ flagship policies and projects.
In Afghanistan, our overall goals must be to create a politically and economically friendly functioning member of the International Community and to deliver to the Afghan people a measure of prosperity necessary to assure their security.
As indicated by the bleak projection of the Taliban’s geographic spread in the maps included in this report, the West is in genuine danger of losing Afghanistan. Rather than continuing to rearrange the deck chairs on a sinking Titanic, a new, interlinked set of principles is necessary in order to claw back some of the ground lost because of the West’s own lack of understanding of the conflict, misguided policies and our failure to make the Afghan people themselves our top priority.
The Afghan people themselves must sit at the heart of these new principles, forming the common denominator in every element of a reinvigorated approach. The traditional power projection pyramid must be inverted, and we must commence a renewed dialogue with the people of Afghanistan before their loyalties are lost for at least another generation. A desperate resort to tribalism or militia will not only be a retrograte step for Afghanistan and the region. It will not lead to the long term stability necessary in our own security interests.
A fresh approach needs to encompass all aspects of operations in Afghanistan, from hard military to soft power projection. However, at the root of this approach must be an enduring commitment to the Afghan people, their welfare and their futures. This 360 degree approach is detailed below:
Recommendations
1. Create the right atmosphere
A New Architecture Counter Insurgency Model should be based on a bottom-up, local vision, combining the use of traditional security instruments with new non-violent security instruments.
The international community needs to seize and retain the initiative on all lines of operation. Military, political and developmental initiatives need tempo and visible results. Ordinary Afghan citizens must be convinced the Taliban can be defeated, and the atmospherics created by NATO are critical.
These would be improved through the use of Muslim forces within ISAF. Participation by states with a significant Muslim population would ensure that the international force has a multi-cultural dimension. The contributions of such states could fall into three categories: Muslim liaison officers accompanying Western forces on bridgebuilding missions into villages to meet with community leaders, thus helping to bridge the cultural divide; senior Muslim military figures to be seconded to work alongside NATO commanders in ISAF headquarters; troops to support NATO-ISAF missions against the Taliban.
An asymmetric opponent can only be defeated by a fleet-footed, broad-spectrum response that recognises the nature of the threat. NATO needs to apply manoeuvrist principles to all levels of operation, meaning that their desire to shatter the enemy’s cohesion and morale underpins the mission.
2. Promotion of non-violent security instruments
Classic security instruments such as military intervention and intelligence must continue to be fully supported – but other elements such as sustainable job creation and development should also be seen as key security instruments, along with the development of the rule of law, effective counter-narcotics policies, literacy, a free and open media and civil society and the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals.
Economic-focused humanitarian intervention should be placed at the core of military planning as a way to pursue an effective hearts and minds strategy. The core challenge is to show the people that the international community is addressing their most basic needs. So far, the failure to do so has given the Taliban a strategic advantage over international troops. A focus on economic humanitarian aid will defuse tensions and create support for the international presence and the central government within rural communities. It will also reduce the growing control that the Taliban exert over those communities, making the US troops’ missions safer.
A key military element of this strategy must be to minimise use of kinetic operations, which have a devastating impact upon those communities affected, frequently cause massive civilian casualties, and offer the insurgency a new pool of recruits. The Taliban insurgency regularly effectively adapts to the changing circumstances on the ground, and we must learn from our enemies and adapt our classic hearts and minds campaign to also adapts to new realities. The first step is to engage in a structural dialogue with the people – yet another non-violent security instrument.
Key non-violent security instruments include an Afghan Community Fund and leadership training. Similar to Brazil’s Bolsa Familia project, a Community would reward positive actions by the Afghan public with government investment and access to finance. In Arab states a Marriage Allowance has been implemented bringing young men into family relationships which assist in preventing their recruitment to extremist causes. Furthermore, widespread leadership training for young Afghans must be organised in order to provide the country’s next generation with the skills necessary to help the conflict-ridden state to flourish.
3. Inverting the Pyramid
The US-led imperative to impose its own brand of democracy on Afghanistan has failed. Although the country has the institutional veneer of a democratic state, its parliamentary and judicial processes mean little to the vast majority of the country. It is now time to flip the current approach on its head, and start to sell democracy at a grassroots level, establishing community-based initiatives that promote the benefits of localised democracy. However, we should learn from one of the most dramatic mistakes of the last seven years: Selling a better future without delivering on our promises will yield yet more ground to the Taliban.
Retrograde steps towards supporting tribal structures and militias over developing a strong democracy and rule of law should be avoided.
4. Unified civil-military command and control (C2) structures
NATO’s political masters must strive towards achieving unity of command for forces in Afghanistan. Although difficult to establish for a multi-national coalition comprising nearly 40 states, and a number of civilian actors within Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), it should be a high priority, and is no longer a luxury item but a necessity. At present, even a commonly-established unity of purpose between these various actors is missing, and that must be a lowest common denominator. The past seven years have shown that the old adage “united we stand, divided we fall”, still holds true when it comes to complex international military missions.
A combined civil-military headquarters should integrate horizontally and vertically, addressing the whole spectrum of operations from the grand strategic to tactical levels. The national interest of individual Western capitals must be refocused on the needs of Afghan people.
5. Boots on the ground
The total number of international troops integrated to ISAF urgently needs to be doubled to a minimum of 80,000 troops. Currently, NATO is in command of the International Force and most ISAF troops are provided by NATO member states. Nevertheless, contributions from individual countries are, even within NATO, largely uneven when considered in proportion to their population or GDP. For instance, France and Spain are contributing less than one soldier per billion USD of GDP while the United Kingdom and Turkey each supply above three soldiers per USD billion.
6. Collective responsibility
The international community must shift from the concept that one leader or organisation has responsibility from resolving Afghanistan. While US President-Elect Obama obviously has a role to play in Afghanistan, the non fighting parts of NATO have to step up and regional players must be a key part of the solution. The longevity of a plan for Afghanistan should not be contingent upon the US electoral cycle. It is wrong for any actor to simply wait and see for President Obama’s Afghan plan, as this abrogation of responsibility is letting the common goal of securing Afghanistan drift out of reach.
7. Military and development efforts must be co-ordinated
A new alliance must be struck between military and humanitarian efforts within the Afghanistan stability strategy. Civilian agencies must develop a deeper understanding of the role that militaries can play in state building efforts, and not view them as a hindrance to their own valuable work. Only the military has the capacity to analyse, plan and implement action in a conflict situation within a short timeframe. This process loop should be formalised for devastated areas of southern Afghanistan, and reinforced by civilians with the requisite skills. Western governments should no longer point at their development budgets as proof of their commitment, when much of this aid does not reach the people of Afghanistan.
The military has a central role to play in supporting the activities of development agencies. As such, it should now be tasked to deliver aid to ravaged areas of the south and east, and be granted control of DFID and CIDA’s war zone budgets. These Combat DFID/Combat CIDA operations will be crucial in responding to the immediate needs of poor and vulnerable Afghans.
As demonstrated in operations in Africa, putting women in the management of aid projects provides an excellent rebalancing of women’s roles in the community, and should be repeated in Afghanistan where possible.
It is time to focus on providing ordinary Afghans with the basic necessities of life; it is simply unacceptable that, seven years after entering the country, the international community has not established mechanisms to ensure that every Afghan has access to food and water.
